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Should a rm charge on a per-use basis or sell subscriptions when its service experiences con-
gestion? Queueing-based models of pricing primarily focus on charging a fee per use for the
service, in part because per-use pricing enables the rm to regulate congestion - raising the per-use
price naturally reduces how frequently customers use a service. The rm has less control over
usage with subscription pricing (by denition, with subscription pricing customers are not charged
proportional to their actual usage), and this is a disadvantage when customers dislike congestion.
However, we show that subscription pricing is more e¤ective at earning revenue. Consequently, the
rm may be better o¤ with subscription pricing, even, surprisingly, when congestion is intuitively
most problematic for the rm: e.g., as congestion becomes more disliked by consumers. We show
that the absolute advantage of subscription pricing relative to per-use pricing can be substantial
whereas the potential advantage of per-use pricing is generally modest. Subscription pricing be-
comes relatively more attractive if consumers become more heterogeneous in their service rates
(e.g., some know they are heavyusers and others know they are lightusers) as long as capacity
is xed, the potential utilization is high and the two segments have substantially di¤erent usage
rates. Otherwise, heterogeneity in usage rates makes subscription pricing less attractive relative to
per-use. We conclude that subscription pricing can be e¤ective even if congestion is relevant for
the overall quality of a service.
How should a rm price its service when congestion is an unavoidable reality? Customers
dislike congestion, so a rm has an incentive to ensure it provides reasonably fast service. At the
same time, the rm needs to earn an economic prot, so the rms pricing scheme must generate
a su¢ cient amount of revenue. Furthermore, these issues are closely linked: the chosen pricing
scheme inuences how frequently customers use a service, which dictates the level of congestion;
congestion correlates with the customersperceived value for the service, and that determines the
amount of revenue the rm can generate.
A natural option is to charge customers a per-use fee or toll: customers pay a per-transaction
fee each time they withdraw money from the ATM; beauty shops and hair salons price on a per-
use basis; and car maintenance companies, such as Pep Boys Auto, charge each time a service is
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completed. Naor (1969) began this line of research and there has been many subsequent extensions
of his basic model, but nearly always with a focus on per-use fees. (See Hassin and Haviv 2003 for
a broad survey of this literature.)
Although the emphasis in the queueing literature has been placed on per-use pricing, other
pricing schemes are observed in practice. Most notably, some rms sell subscriptions for the use
of their service: a health club may charge an annual membership that allows a customer to use
the facility without additional charge for each visit; AOL, an Internet service provider, initially
charged customers per-use access fees but later switched to subscription pricing (a monthly access
fee with no usage limitation); Netix, a retailer that provides movie DVDs for rental, also uses
subscription pricing (a monthly fee for an unlimited number of rentals); Disney charges an entry
fee for its theme park without charging per ride on the attractions; etcetera.
Despite the existence of subscriptions in practice, a subscription pricing strategy has a clear
limitation in the presence of congestion e¤ects: subscribers are not charged per use, so it is intuitive
that they seek service more frequently (e.g., use the health club too often), thereby increasing con-
gestion and decreasing the value all subscribers receive from the service. As a result, in a setting
with clear congestion costs (e.g., in a queueing model) one might assume that subscription pricing
would be inferior to per-use pricing. However, in this paper we demonstrate that subscription
pricing may indeed be a rms better pricing strategy despite its limitations with respect to con-
gestion. We do so in two di¤erent capacity management scenarios: (i) the rms service capacity
is exogenously xed; and (ii) the rm endogenously chooses its service capacity in addition to its
pricing policy.
The next section reviews the extensive literature on pricing services, with an emphasis on models
that address the issue of congestion. Section 2 details our base model. Sections 3 and 4 compare
the two pricing schemes under two di¤erent assumptions for how the rms capacity is determined.
Section 5 extends the base model to consider the e¤ects of heterogenous usage rates. Section 6
summarizes our conclusions.
1 Related Literature
Our work is primarily related to three streams of literature: pricing in queueing models; the theory
of clubs; and advance purchase pricing.
Queueing theory provides a natural framework for modeling congestion, and we adopt that
framework as well. However, as already mentioned, the literature on pricing of queues generally
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only considers per-use pricing (e.g., Littlechild 1974, Edelson and Hilderbrand 1975, De Vany 1976,
Mendelson 1985, Chen and Frank 2004). Per-use pricing is su¢ cient for maximizing social welfare,
but it is known that a prot maximizing rm does not choose the welfare maximizing price (e.g.,
Naor 1969).
Randhawa and Kumar (2008) and Bitran, Rocha e Oliveira and Schilkrut (2008) do consider
additional pricing schemes in queueing models. Randhawa and Kumar (2008) compare per-use
pricing with subscription pricing that imposes limits on usage, e.g., Netix has a plan in which a
customer can view as many movies as they want as long as they do not possess more than four
DVDs at a time. They show that this constrained subscription plan may be better for the rm
than the unconstrained per-use pricing because it reduces the volatility of the demand process the
rm experiences. We do not consider subscription pricing with limitations, i.e., in our model
a subscription pricing plan allows for unlimited usage. Furthermore, in their model the two
plans have the same revenue potential, whereas in our model a key di¤erence is that subscription
pricing can have a higher revenue potential than per-use pricing. Hence, the restriction on usage
with their subscription plan is necessary to create a distinction between the two pricing schemes.
Bitran, Rocha e Oliveira and Schilkrut (2008) study a two-part tari¤ that combines both per-use
and subscription pricing. Their focus is di¤erent than ours: they do not compare per-use to
subscription pricing and instead emphasize how consumer uncertainty regarding service quality
a¤ects the dynamics of their system over time (in our model consumers have rational expectations,
so we do not explicitly model the learning process).
There is a literature in economics on the pricing of shared facilities (i.e., clubs) subject to
congestion, such as swimming pools and golf clubs: e.g., Berglas (1976), Scotchmer (1985). Just as
in our model, customers prefer that the service/facility is used by fewer people so that there is less
congestion. These papers show that a two-part tari¤ is optimal for the rm: a per-use fee is chosen
to induce a usage level that maximizes social welfare and a subscription fee is charged to transfer
all rents from customers to the rm. The literature on non-linear pricing also studies the design of
two-part tari¤s for congestion-proned services (e.g., Clay et al. 1992, Miravete 1996, and Masuda
and Whang 2006). They show that when consumers have heterogeneous needs for the service, a
menu of two part tari¤s may be optimal. Like Bitran, Rocha e Oliveira and Schilkrut (2008), these
papers do not compare per-use pricing to subscription pricing. Strictly speaking, according to our
model the rm always prefers the two-part tari¤ over either subscription or per-use pricing (each
is a subset of the set of two-part tari¤s). However, we believe a comparison between subscription
and per-use pricing is warranted. The queueing literature focuses on per-use pricing and both
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per-use pricing and subscriptions are observed in practice. In addition, a two-part tari¤ may not
be desirable for reasons that we do not model (nor are generally modeled): e.g., a consumer may
dislike being charged twice for the same service, especially if they do not understand the motivation
for such a pricing scheme. Furthermore, rms might prefer to forgo the additional revenues from
using a two-part tari¤ to save the transaction costs and the administrative burden required for its
implementation. Disney, for example, initially charged consumers both to get into the park and
for specic rides within the park, but later it abandoned per-ride charges.
Barro and Romer (1987) demonstrate that per-use pricing can be equivalent to subscription
pricing. For example, they argue that a ski slope could generate the same revenue by charging a
fee per ride or by charging a daily lift ticket price (which is analogous to a one-day subscription).
However, in their model they assume that the number of ski-lift rides is xed and fully utilized no
matter which pricing scheme is used. Hence, a daily lift ticket price can be chosen such that usage
is the same as with a per-ride price. In contrast, in our model consumers regulate their usage
depending on the pricing scheme - subscription pricing leads consumers to use the facility more
than any positive per-use pricing scheme - resulting in di¤erent utilizations of the server. Hence,
in our model the two schemes are not equivalent.
Our subscription pricing scheme resembles advance-purchase pricing (e.g., DeGraba, 1995; Xie
and Shugan 2001). When consumers purchase in advance of the service, such as buying a concert
ticket weeks before the event, consumers are willing to pay their expected value for the service. In
contrast, when consumers spot purchase, i.e., when they know their value for the service, they are
naturally willing to pay only their realized value. When purchasing in advance, consumers are more
homogeneous relative to the spot market, so the rm can earn more revenue by selling in advance
than by selling just with a spot price: it can be better to sell in advance to every customer at their
expected value than to sell in the spot market to a portion of consumers (i.e., those consumers with
a high realized value). In our model subscriptions also has this ability to extract rents because
consumers are more homogeneous when they purchase subscriptions than when they purchase on
a per-use basis. However, we consider the impact of congestion, whereas the advance-purchase
models do not (i.e., consumers in those models do not regulate their usage based on the pricing
policy).
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2 Model Description
A single rm provides a service to a market with a potential number of M homogenous customers.
Consumers are assumed to be innitesimali.e., every consumer is small relative to the size of
the market. Each customer nds the service to be valuable on multiple occasions, or service
opportunities. For example, a customer may wish to occasionally use a teller at her bank, use the
internet repeatedly or rent a movie at least a couple of times per month. This stream of service
opportunities occurs for each customer at rate  : At the moment a service opportunity occurs,
a customer observes the value, or utility, V; she would receive if she were to receive the service
to satisfy that opportunity. Service values for each customer are independent and identically
distributed across opportunities, where the support of V is the interval [0; v]. Hence, we have a
single market segment of consumers, so di¤erences between per-use and subscription pricing are
not driven by a desire to price discriminate between segments, in contrast to Essegaier, Gupta and
Zhang (2002). We discuss multiple customer segments in Section 5.
Although customers value receiving the service, they prefer as fast a service process as possible
- each customer incurs a cost w per unit of time to complete service (time waiting and in service).1
Finally, consumers neither receive utility nor incur disutility when not in the service process and
waiting for the next service opportunity to arise.
The rm o¤ers one of two pricing schemes: a per-use fee or a subscription price. The per-use
fee, p; is a charge for each service completion: e.g., a fee for withdrawing money from an automatic
teller machine, a fee for each visit to a health club, or a per minute fee for accessing a database.
A subscription price, k; is a fee per unit of time which is independent of the amount of service
the customer receives. (This denition of a subscription is equivalent to a xed fee, K; for a
nite duration, d; with unlimited usage during that time, where k = K=d.) Where useful, we use
pand ssubscripts to signify notation associated with the per-use and subscription schemes,
respectively.
The servers processing rate is . In section 3 we assume  is exogenous, whereas in section 4
the rm chooses  subject to a fee that is proportional to the service rate. W () is the expected
service time. We use the term service time to refer to the total time to complete the service, i.e., it
includes time waiting and in service. We assume that W (M) is su¢ ciently small relative to 1= ;
where  = M is the maximum possible arrival rate of service opportunities (i.e., the arrival rate
when every customer seeks service at every service opportunity). This implies that a customers
1As in Afeche and Mendelson (2004), it is possible to allow the waiting cost to be linear in the value of the service,
w = a+ bv: A detailed analysis is available from the authors.
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information about the queue length during one service occasion is of little use in predicting the
waiting time for the next service encounter. It also implies that for a xed potential arrival rate of
service, ; the potential population of customers,M; is large, they do not seek service too frequently
( is small) and capacity is su¢ ciently large that W (M) << 1= . (For example, the inter-arrival
time of services could be measured in days whereas service times could be measured in minutes.)
Consequently, the arrival rate to the rms queue does not vary (approximately) with the queue
length (which is typically assumed in the queueing literature) and there is little chance that a service
opportunity arises while a customer is in the service process. For example, a customer does not
receive another need to withdraw cash from an automatic teller machine while she is in the process
of withdrawing cash. (See Randhawa and Kumar (2008) for a model of a closed queueing system
in which the arrival rate to the queue depends on the number of customers in queue.) Therefore,
the expected service time depends only on the actual arrival rate, . The function W () is strictly
increasing (W 0() > 0) and convex (W 00()  0). (Thus, W (0) = 1= because 1= is a customers
service time when there is no congestion.) Naturally, W () is decreasing in :
When a service opportunity occurs, a customer decides whether or not to seek service (i.e.,
join the rms service system). The decision is based on three factors: the value of the service
opportunity, the cost associated with the expected time to complete the service transaction and the
rms pricing policy. Although the customer observes the value for a particular service opportunity
before deciding to seek service or not, the customer does not observe the rms current queue length.
However, the customer has an expectation for the average arrival rate of customers to the rms
service, ; and the customer knows the function that translates an arrival rate into an expected
service time, W ():2 Thus, wW () is the expected cost to the customer of the time to receive
one service opportunity. We refer to wW () as the expected service time cost or the expected
congestion cost. Note, a customer cannot balk (or, chooses not to balk) from the queue after
choosing to seek service (otherwise, the customer would e¤ectively be able to observe the queue
length before the joining decision is made). Finally, the rms pricing policy clearly inuences the
customers decision. With each service opportunity the customer decides whether to seek service
based on the amount of utility that would be earned from the opportunity relative to congestion
costs and the rms per-use fee (which in the case of subscription pricing, is zero). Whether to
adopt a subscription is based on the expected arrival of service opportunities and their expected
net utilities. We assume that the impact of any one consumer on the average queue length is
2 In fact, the customer only needs to have an expectation of the rms service time and that expectation must be
correct (i.e., they do not need to know the functional form of W ()):
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insignicant. Consumers are risk neutral and make choices based on the average utility each
option generates (rather than the discounted utility of each option). In addition, consumers make
pure strategy choices (join the service system or not, subscribe or not). Allowing mixed strategy
choices either favors subscription pricing or has no impact on our results.3
To complete the denition of the model, we provide some additional structure for the service
value distribution and the system-time function. Let F () be the distribution function and f ()
the density function of each service value: assume F is di¤erentiable, F (0) = 0; and F exhibits an
increasing failure rate (IFR). For some results we invoke one of the following additional assumptions
related to the hazard rate, h(x) = f(x)= F (x); where F (x) = 1  F (x):
Assumption 1 (A1) h0(x)=h(x)2 is decreasing
Assumption 2 (A2) xh0(x) is increasing
(A2) holds for a power distribution with parameter  > 1; while both (A1) and (A2) hold
if F is uniform on the support [0; v] or Weibull with parameters   1 and  > 0. (Note, a
Weibull distribution with  = 1 is an exponential distribution.) In both versions of the model,
we assume F is uniform on the support [0; v] to derive analytical comparisons between the pricing
schemes: Regarding the system-time function, in the capacity choice model (section 4), we assume
W () = 1=( ); which corresponds to the expected time in anM=M=1 queue with rst-come-rst
serve priority. Furthermore, we use that functional form to compare the pricing schemes in the
exogenous capacity model (section 3).
3 Exogenous Capacity
In this section we analyze a version of our model in which the rms service processing rate, ; or
capacity, is exogenously xed with either pricing scheme. This analysis is appropriate for a rm
that has the short term exibility to modify its pricing but does not have the short term ability
to alter its capacity. For each pricing scheme we derive the rms equilibrium arrival rate and
optimal revenues, which allows us to establish conditions under which one scheme is preferred over
another.
3Consumers need to decide with each service opportunity whether to seek service or not. The optimal strategy
for a consumer is always a pure strategy conditional on the value of the service opportunity. Hence, including mixed
strategies has no impact with this decision. Regarding the subscription decision, we nd that the rms prot can be
higher if mixed strategies are allowed in the exogenous capacity model. However, the rms prot is unchanged in
the endogenous capacity model by the inclusion of mixed strategies. (Refer to Section 3 of the electronic companion
for a complete analysis of equilibria in mixed strategies under both capacity scenarios.)
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3.1 Per-Use Pricing
With per-use pricing a customer observes the realized value of a particular service opportunity and
then requests service if the net utility is non-negative, i.e., the value of that opportunity is greater
than or equal to p + wW (). Given that p, w and  are common to all customers (they all have
the same expectations) and constant across time, there is some threshold value, v; such that a
customer seeks service whenever the realized value of an opportunity is v or greater, and otherwise
the customer passes on the opportunity:
v = p+ wW ():
The actual arrival rate to the service is then  F (v) : For expectations to be consistent with actual
operating conditions (i.e.,  =  F (v)) the threshold v must satisfy
v = p+ wW
 
 F (v)

: (1)
Given that W is decreasing, it follows that there is a unique solution to (1). Furthermore, the
threshold is increasing in the per-use fee, p:
The rms revenue is Rp = p; which can be expressed in terms of the threshold v :
Rp(v) =  F (v)
 
v   wW ( F (v)) :
That is, the rms maximization problem can be written as: maxv Rp(v). The following theorem
establishes that an optimal threshold, vp, exists and is unique (proofs are provided in the appendix).
Theorem 1 The per-use revenue function, Rp(v); is quasi-concave and vp = argmaxv Rp(v) is
uniquely dened by
vp = wW ( F (vp)) + w F (vp)W
0( F (vp)) +
F (vp)
f (vp)
: (2)
To translate vp back into an actual price, the rms optimal per-use fee is
pp =
F (vp)
f (vp)
+ w F (vp)W
0( F (vp)): (3)
To understand the economic intuition behind (2), note that the rst term in the right-hand side
is the customers waiting time cost. The second term is the externality the customer imposes on
other consumers due to the (innitesimal) increase in arrival rate when she decides to join. From
a social welfare view point, customers should join as long as their utility from joining (vp) is larger
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than the sum of these rst two terms. However, the third term, F (vp)=f (vp), is added by the prot
maximizing monopolist. This correction term implies that the per-use arrival rate in equilibrium
is smaller than the social optimal arrival rate. Furthermore, from (3), the optimal per-use fee is
greater than the welfare maximizing per-use fee.
3.2 Subscription Pricing
With a subscription scheme there is no explicit fee charged per transaction, e.g., the members of a
health club can use the service whenever they wish without additional charge. However, a customer
may not take advantage of a service opportunity if her value for that opportunity is low relative
to her expectation of congestion costs, and that expectation depends on the number of subscribers
and the frequency of their usage. For now, we assume all consumers subscribe and then we conrm
that expectation is correct. As a result, if each consumer uses the threshold vs to decide whether
to seek service or not, then the arrival rate to the service is  F (vs) :  is the arrival rate of service
opportunities conditional that all M consumers are subscribers and F (vs) is the fraction of service
opportunities that generate a service request. In equilibrium, the value of the service opportunity
at which a consumer is indi¤erent, vs; exactly equals the expected congestion cost:
vs = wW
 
 F (vs)

: (4)
Now consider whether to purchase a subscription or not. At the time this decision is made
the customer does not know when future service opportunities will occur or their values, but does
know his/her threshold value, vs, for seeking service. Hence, as part of the purchasing decision, a
customer expects that a subscription generates the following net value per service opportunity,
F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs) :
F (vs) is the probability a service opportunity is su¢ ciently valuable to seek service, E [V jV  vs] is
the value received conditional that a service opportunity yields a value greater than the threshold
and the last term, vs; is the expected congestion cost (from (4)).
Given that service opportunities arrive at rate  , it is optimal for the rm to set the subscription
rate, k; equal to the value of a subscription per unit of time (net of system-time cost)4:
k =  F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs) :
4Lowering k merely reduces revenue per customer without changing demand, so that cannot be optimal. There is
no demand with a higher k; so that is not optimal either.
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All consumers purchase a subscription even though they are indi¤erent between doing so or not,
which conrms our initial assumption that all consumers subscribe.5 As a result, subscription
pricing allows the rm to extract all consumer surplus, conditional on the level of congestion
that subscriptions generate. The latter conditional di¤erentiates this work from the literature on
advance selling (e.g., Xie and Shugan 2000) - in those models the potential consumer surplus is
independent of the pricing scheme, whereas here it depends on how much congestion materializes.
The rms resulting revenue can be expressed in terms of the threshold vs :
Rs(vs) = kM =  F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs) :
Note, while the threshold vp was a decision variable for the rm with per-use pricing, the rm
does not control the threshold vs with subscription pricing - it is set by (4). In other words, with
exogenous capacity and subscription pricing, the rm cannot control congestion even though it
possesses an e¤ective mechanism for maximizing revenue conditional on the systems congestion.
That said, congestion is subject to some self regulationcustomers request service only for service
opportunities whose values exceed their expected congestion cost.
3.3 Comparison between Per-Use and Subscription Pricing
This section compares the revenues generated by per-use and subscription pricing with an exogenous
capacity and quanties the upper bound on the revenue loss from using these schemes relative to
the optimal scheme.
To compare the revenue generated via these two schemes, note that with subscriptions a con-
sumer pays an amount that equals the average net value of her service requests, E [V jV  v]  
wW
 
 F (v)

whereas with per-use pricing, she only pays for the net value of the marginal service
request, v   wW   F (v). Consequently, if the congestion levels were the same with either pric-
ing scheme (i.e., the thresholds v were identical) then subscription pricing clearly generates more
revenue. We refer to this as the revenue extracting benet of subscription pricing. However,
the level of congestion will not be identical (in general) across the two schemes. As one would
expect, a comparison of (2) and (4) reveals that per-use pricing results in less congestion (a higher
threshold) than subscription pricing: vp  vs. This establishes the tradeo¤ between these two
schemes: subscription pricing is better at extracting revenue but per-use pricing is better at con-
trolling congestion. The rms preference over these two schemes depends on which of these two
5 If mixed strategies are allowed for the consumer purchase decision, then it is possible to show that the rm may
be able to earn higher revenue with subscription pricing than we report.
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e¤ects dominates. For example, in the special case in which consumers are indi¤erent to conges-
tion (i.e., when w = 0), subscription pricing yields higher revenue than per-use and generates more
social value per unit time (by having larger usage rates). However, as congestion becomes more
costly to consumers (as w increase), per-use pricing may be more attractive.
To make these comparisons more explicit, we assume in the rest of this section that V  U [0; v]
and W () = 1=(   ): We now dene the set of parameters for which the rm can earn non-
negative revenue. Although the rms problem is determined by four parameters (w; ;  and v),
the next theorem indicates that the pricing schemesrelative rankings depend only on two of them.
Lemma 1 The relative revenue between subscription and per-use pricing, Rs=Rp; can be expressed
in terms of  and , where  = w=v and  = =, and both revenues are non-negative for
 2 [0; 1]:
Whether per-use pricing or subscriptions are preferred depends on  (which measures the rela-
tive strength of congestion costs to service values) and the potential utilization rate of the system,
:
Theorem 2 When  = 0, subscription pricing always yields higher revenue than per-use. For
each value of  > 0, there exists a unique e (), such that subscription yields higher revenue than
per-use pricing for  < e() (recall,  is the potential utilization, =): Otherwise, per-use pricing
yields higher revenue. Moreover, e() is decreasing in .
From Theorem 2, per-use is preferred over subscription for highly congested systems. The
key issue is the degree of congestion needed for per-use to be preferred. For various levels of
positive congestion costs,  > 0; Table 1 provides the potential utilization rate, e(); at which
the two schemes yield the same revenue. It can be demonstrated (proposition 4 of the electronic
companion) that lim!0 e() = p2 and lim!1 e() = 1: Thus, subscription pricing always
generates higher revenue than per-use pricing when the potential arrival rate to the queue is less
than the processing rate. Subscription pricing can be preferred even if the potential arrival rate
is as much as 140% of the rms processing rate. Subscription pricing may also be preferred
when the systems actual utilization rate,  F (v)=, is high. Table 1 lists the systems actual
utilization rate when the potential utilization rate is e(): For example, when  = 0:01 and
 = 1:411, subscription pricing yields the same revenue as per-use pricing even though the actual
utilizations are 96:8% and 64:8% respectively. Of course, subscriptions performs better than
per-use under such high utilization rates, when the relative congestion cost parameter, , is low.
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Table 1. Potential utilization rates, e () ; that yield identical revenue with per-use and subscription
pricing, as well as actual utilizations when the potential arrival rate is e ().
Actual utilization (%)
when  = e ()
 e () Per-use Subscription
0:99 1:002 0:3 0:5
0:75 1:069 7:1 13:8
0:50 1:153 16:4 31:3
0:25 1:264 30:5 55:5
0:01 1:411 64:8 96:8
When  is high, subscriptions will be preferred to per-use pricing if the actual utilizations are more
moderate. In addition, it can be shown that the actual utilization rates are increasing in  (proof
available from authors): Thus, when  = 0:01; subscription pricing is preferred whenever it yields
an actual utilization rate that is lower than 96:8%. Hence, although subscription pricing cannot
control congestion well, it still generates higher revenue than per-use pricing even in systems with
a considerable amount of congestion.
To explore the strength of subscription pricing further, the next theorem characterizes revenues
with extreme levels of potential utilization.
Theorem 3 The following limits hold: (i) lim!0Rs = v (1  )2 =2 and lim!0Rp = v (1  )2 =4.
(ii) lim!1Rx = 0; x 2 fs; pg.
Subscription pricing generates twice as much revenue as per-use when capacity is unlimited
( = 0). Therefore, subscription pricing starts with a considerable advantage relative to per-use
pricing. As a result, congestion needs to be substantial in the system before the congestion-
controlling benets of per-use pricing dominates the rent-extracting capability of subscription pric-
ing. Furthermore, revenue declines in  with all schemes, so per-use pricing dominates subscription
pricing only when revenues are in fact low. This suggests that per-use pricing can provide only
a modest absolute advantage relative to subscription pricing, but the absolute advantage of sub-
scription pricing can be substantial. Taken together, these results indicate that from a practical
perspective, subscription pricing can indeed be better than per-use pricing even if capacity is xed
and the system is subject to congestion related costs.
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3.4 Comparison to the Two-Part Tari¤
As mentioned in Section 1, the two-part tari¤ is the optimal pricing scheme in this setting. A
two-part tari¤ combines a per-use fee with a subscription rate. The rm can set a per-use price
to achieve the social optimal congestion and it can set a subscription price to extract all customer
welfare. Hence, social welfare is maximized and is fully extracted by the rm. A complete
analysis of the two-part tari¤ is relegated to the online companion (propositions 1-3 of the electronic
companion): we characterize the two-part tari¤ scheme, show that the congestion under two-part
tari¤ is lower than that under subscription and higher than under per-use, and nd that the revenue
generated by the two-part tari¤ is well approximated by subscription when  is low and by per-use
pricing when !1.
Despite its ability to extract revenue, as discussed earlier, two-part tari¤s may not be o¤ered
in practice for reasons that we do not model. Nevertheless, we can evaluate the percent loss of
using an optimal simplescheme (per-use or subscription) relative to the optimal two-part tari¤.6.
Figure 1 illustrates the percent of two-part tari¤ revenue which is attained by optimally setting one
of the two simple schemes as a function of potential utilization, , for di¤erent values of . For any
xed , the maximum percent revenue loss of the optimal simple scheme relative to the optimal
two-part tari¤ occurs at the potential utilization where both simple schemes are equally protable
(i.e., at e). The revenue loss is lower at lower values of  (subscription pricing is optimal) and
higher values of  (per-use pricing is optimal), vanishing at  ! 0 and at  ! 1. Moreover, the
maximum percent revenue loss is decreasing in .
4 Capacity Choice
In section 3 the rm can choose how to price but not its capacity, so the pricing decision results only
in variation in service time. In this section the rm chooses how to price and its capacity, so the
pricing decision inuences both the rms capacity and its service time. We assume that capacity
is costly - the rm incurs a cost at rate c for maintaining capacity ; where c > 0: Furthermore,
we continue to assume W () = 1=(  ).
4.1 Per-Use Pricing
The consumers choice in this setting is the same as in the xed capacity model. As a result, we can
express the rms prot function in terms of the threshold value at which consumers are indi¤erent,
6Giridharan and Mendelson (1994) also quantify the loss of using a sub-optimal pricing scheme in a model with
congestion.
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Figure 1. Percent of two-part tari¤ revenue attained by the optimal simple scheme as a function of
potential utilization, ; for di¤erent values of :
v, and capacity, :
p (v; ) = Rp(v)  c
=  F (v)

v   w
   F (v)

  c:
The prot function is concave in ; so it is straightforward to determine that p(v) is the rms
optimal capacity for a given threshold, v, where,
p(v) =  F (v) +
r
w F (v)
c
:
The rms prot rate, p
 
v; p(v)

; can now be written as
p (v) = 

F (v)(v   c)  2
q
F (v)

where the constant  is dened for convenience:
 =
p
cw=:
The rms solves the maximization problem, maxv p(v). The following theorem establishes the
uniqueness of the optimal per-use threshold.
Theorem 4 If v > c, there exists an upper bound p, such that for every  < p there exists a
unique optimal threshold, vp = argmaxv p(v) that yields positive prot, p(vp) > 0: This threshold
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is the smallest solution to the implicit equation given by:
vp =
F (vp)
f (vp)
+
q
F (vp)
+ c: (5)
Furthermore, if (A1) holds, then there exist two solutions to (5). Otherwise, there does not exist
an optimal vp < v. The optimal capacity is
p =  F (vp) +
r
w F (vp)
c
(6)
and the rms per-use fee is
pp = vp   w=
 
p    F (vp)

:
The bound in Theorem 4, p; merely states that the rm can earn a positive prot only if
capacity is su¢ ciently cheap, customers are su¢ ciently patient and the market is su¢ ciently large.
Observe that we restrict attention to the interesting case in which prots are positive. If  > p (so
that p(vp) < 0), the rm is strictly better o¤not selling per-use and if  = p (so that p(vp) = 0),
the rm is indi¤erent.
4.2 Subscription Pricing
With subscription pricing and a xed capacity the rm has little control over congestion. However,
the rm gains some control over congestion when the rm can choose its capacity. In particular,
if  is the rms capacity, then a consumer with value v = w=
 
   F (v) is indi¤erent between
seeking service or not. Instead of thinking in terms of the rm choosing , we can use that
relationship to frame the rms problem in terms of choosing the threshold, v;
s(v) =  F (v) + w=v
The rms prot function can then be written as
s(v) =  F (v) (E[V jV  v]  v)  c
 
 F (v) + w=v

where the rst term is the revenue the rm earns from subscriptions assuming the rm chooses the
maximum subscription fee that induces all consumers to purchase a subscription, conditional on
the expected level of congestion. The rms solves the maximization problem, maxv s(v).
Theorem 5 If E [V ] > c, there exists an upper bound s, such that for every  < s, there exists
an optimal threshold, vs 2 argmaxs(v); that yields positive prot, s(vs) > 0: This threshold is
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implicitly dened by:
vs = 
s
1
F (vs)  cf(vs) : (7)
Furthermore, if (A2) holds, then there exist two solutions to (7) and the smallest solution is the
unique optimal threshold. The optimal capacity is
s =  F (vs) +
w
vs
(8)
and the rms subscription rate is
k =  F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs) :
As with Theorem 4, Theorem 5 indicates that a positive prot occurs only when capacity is not
too expensive, customers do not incur time costs that are too high and there is a su¢ cient number
of customers in the market. However, the two bounds, p and s need not be the same. Observe
also, that as with Theorem 4, we restrict attention to the case in which prots are positive. If
 > s (so that s(vs) < 0), the rm is better o¤ not selling subscriptions and if  = s (so that
s(vs) = 0), the rm is indi¤erent.
4.3 Comparison
In this section we assume V  U [0; v]. Let vt and t be the optimal threshold value and the service
rate chosen when the rm uses the two-part tari¤ scheme. As with xed capacity, by charging a
two-part tari¤, the rm is able to achieve social optimal congestion (by setting an appropriate per-
use fee) and to extract all consumer welfare (by setting a subscription rate that makes consumers
indi¤erent to subscribing), so the two-part tari¤ is optimal for the rm.
As in the xed capacity case, we show that per-use pricing leads to a system with less congestion
than optimal and that subscription pricing leads to more congestion than optimal: vs < vt < vp:
Furthermore, the rm invests more in capacity than optimal with subscription pricing (to control
congestion somewhat) and less with per-use pricing: p < t < s: Even though the rm invests
more in capacity with subscription pricing, congestion is also higher with that scheme: us(c) >
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ut(c) > up(c)
7; where ux(c) is the actual utilization rate,
ux(c) =  F (vx)=x; x 2 fs; pg:
As in the exogenous capacity case, when w = 0, congestion is not an issue. The rms choice is
simple. Because there are no congestion costs, the rm has no incentive to provide fast serviceit
will choose  =  and the capacity cost will be the same for both pricing schemes. That is, similar
to the exogenous capacity case, when w = 0, subscription dominates per-use for all values of c.
In the discussion that follows, we compare between the two pricing schemes when the marginal
congestion cost is positive (i.e., for w > 0). If capacity is inexpensive, c = 0; subscription pricing
performs strictly better than per-use pricing,
s(vsjc = 0) > p(vpjc = 0) :
without the concern of congestion, the revenue extraction benet of subscription pricing dominates.
However, subscription prots decrease at a faster rate with respect to the cost of capacity,
@s (vs)
@c
<
@p (vp)
@c
< 0 :
subscription pricing is more sensitive to capacity costs than per-use pricing. Dene cx; as the max-
imum capacity cost that allows a non-negative prot with pricing scheme x 2 fs; pg : Combining
these results, one of two scenarios emerges: either cs  cp or cp  cs:
Figure 2 illustrates these scenarios. On the left hand side, cs  cp. There exists some ~c such that
the two schemes earn the same prot, s (vsj~c) = p (vpj~c) > 0: It follows that subscription yields
higher prot than per-use pricing for c 2 [0; ~c] while per-use is better for c 2 [~c; cp]. Furthermore,
for c 2 [cs; cp]; subscription pricing cannot earn a positive prot whereas per-use pricing does. That
is what one might expect given that subscription pricing gives the rm less control over congestion -
if capacity costs are su¢ ciently high, per-use pricing is preferable and may be the only scheme that
yields a positive prot. However, while per-use pricing can be more protable than subscription
pricing, it is only more protable when capacity is su¢ ciently expensive and the absolute advantage
of per-use pricing is generally small, whereas the absolute advantage of subscription pricing can be
7Refer to Propositions 6 and 7 in the electronic companion for formal statements and proofs of these three results.
In fact, the results proved in the electronic companion are more general. We are able to show that vt < vp, p < t
and ut(c) > up(c) for every IFR distribution. The comparisons of the subscription threshold value with the two-part
tari¤ one was only proven for the uniform distribution, but we observed numerically that the results resported in
this section hold for the Weibull distribution with   1, as well. (The comulative distribution function of a Weibull
random variable X is: F (x) = 1  e (x=) , where  > 0 and  > 0.) A detailed description of the numerical analysis
is available from the authors.
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Figure 2. Prot rates of the two pricing schemes with respect to the capacity cost, c. The following
parameter values are used: (a) w = 0:05; and (b) w = 0:5. ( = 1 and v = 10 in both panels.)
large.
The second scenario, cp  cs; is illustrated on the right hand side of Figure 2. Subscription
pricing is preferred if c 2 [0; cp] and subscription pricing is the only scheme that returns a positive
prot if c 2 [cp; cs]: In other words, it is possible that subscription pricing is the preferred scheme
for any capacity cost that allows the rm to make a prot. Furthermore, if capacity is su¢ ciently
expensive, it is possible that subscription pricing can yield a prot whereas per-use pricing can-
not: in those situations capacity is su¢ ciently expensive that per-use pricing is unable to extract
enough revenue from customers to cover the cost of capacity.8 (Refer to Proposition 8 of the online
companion for a formal statement and proof of the result.)
The only di¤erence between the two panels in Figure 2 is that the right hand side has a higher
waiting cost: w = 0:5 instead of w = 0:05. In fact, it can be shown (Proposition 9 of the online
companion) that there exists a ew such that for all w > ew the second scenario occurs, i.e., if the
marginal waiting cost is su¢ ciently high, subscription pricing dominates per-use pricing for all
capacity costs that yield a positive prot. In other words, when congestion is most costly, in the
sense that the service-time cost is high, then subscription pricing can be better than per-use pricing
even though it has less control over congestion. To explain, if congestion costs are high, a large
capacity must be chosen to minimize congestion, and this can only be protable when the pricing
scheme is able to extract a su¢ cient amount of revenue.
8This result provides an interesting contrast with the necessary conditions for each pricing scheme to be protable.
Recall, E [V ] > c is necessary for subscription pricing while the less restrictive v > c is necessary for per-use pricing.
These are only necessary conditions, and not su¢ cient conditions, as we have demonstrated. Therefore, it would be
misleading to conclude from those conditions that a high capacity cost favors per-use pricing in all circumstances.
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Figure 3. Protability regions in w   c space for each pricing scheme.
Figure 3 illustrates the threshold structure that identies the regions in which each pricing
scheme is more protable. When the combination of capacity and congestion cost parameters is
high (i.e., for (w; c) points located above the solid line), both pricing schemes yield negative prots.
Subscriptions are preferred in the lower region and per-use is preferred in the region with low w
and high c:
It is also illustrative to compare the pricing schemes with respect to actual utilization. It
can be shown, that the relevant metric is w=v: (Note, with a xed capacity we use w=v for
making comparisons between the two pricing schemes, but now  is endogenous and di¤erent across
schemes.) Table 2 provides the rms actual utilization under each pricing scheme when capacity
is ec; i.e., when the marginal cost of capacity is such that per-use and subscription pricing yield
the same prot. (If w were any higher, then subscription pricing dominates per-use pricing for all
utilizations that yield a positive prot, i.e., in that case we enter the w > ew regime.) We observe
numerically that actual utilization is increasing in c with each pricing scheme. Consequently,
subscription pricing is better than per use pricing for all utilizations that are lower than those
indicated in the table. For example, when w=v = 0:03; subscription pricing is better than per-
use pricing whenever it yields a utilization of 80% or lower. The table indicates that subscription
pricing can be better than per-use pricing even if the utilization rate is quite high (say, higher than
98%). Therefore, as in the previous model, subscription pricing can be better than per-use pricing
even if it results in a highly utilized system.
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Table 2. Actual utilization when capacity is such that subscription pricing and per-use pricing yield the
same prot (i.e., c = ~c):
w=v 0.03 0.02 0.005 0.002 0.0005 0.0001 0.00001
up 61.4 67.2 81.9 88.1 93.8 97.2 99.1
us 80.2 83.7 91.7 94.8 97.4 98.8 99.6
5 CustomersHeterogeneity in Usage Rates
In our model, customers are heterogenous in their realized values for service opportunities, but
they are otherwise homogenous. A natural relaxation of this model is to allow heterogeneity in
service usage rates. For example, suppose there are two equal sized segments of consumers. One
segment has service opportunities that occur at rate h =  +  and the other segment has service
opportunities that occur at rate  l =    ; where 0   < ; i.e.,  is the average arrival rate. If
consumers do not know a priori which segment they belong to, then our analysis continues to hold
because the consumers remain homogenous in their expectations. To create meaningful segments,
it is necessary to assume that consumers know a priori which segment they belong to. This section
considers a model with this assumption.
Interestingly, the per-use results in sections 3 and 4 continue to hold without any needed mod-
ication. To explain, with per-use pricing each customer makes a decision with each service
opportunity, so the rate at which service opportunities occur has no impact on any one decision.
All that matters is the aggregate rate at which consumers use the service - as long as  is held
constant, it does not matter if there is one ( = 0) or two segments ( > 0) or how far apart the
two segments are.
On the other hand, the existence of di¤erent segments inuences subscription pricing. We
show that when the service rate is xed, heterogeneity in usage rates may increase or decrease
subscription revenues, but that heterogeneity always decreases prots when the rm chooses the
level of capacity. With subscription pricing the rm has two choices. The rst is to set the
subscription rate such that all types purchase:
kl =  l F (vsl) (E [V jV  vsl]  vsl) ;
where
vsl = wW
 
M F (vsl)

:
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The second is to set the subscription rate high enough so that only the high usage types purchase,
kh = h F (vsh) (E [V jV  vsh]  vsh)
where
vsh = wW
 
Mh F (vsh)=2

:
Consider rst the xed capacity model (section 3). Let Rl () and Rh () be the rms revenue
functions when selling to both segments and to only the high usage segment, respectively. In our
original model,  = 0; the subscription price is kl; all consumers subscribe and the rm extracts all
social welfare. As the market becomes more segmented (that is,  increases) the rm must reduce
kl to capture both segments. The low type consumers continue to earn zero surplus but now
the high type consumers are able to retain some surplus which increases as more segmentation is
introduced. Hence, Rl (0) > Rl () 8 2 (0; ) : conditional on all customers subscribing, compared
to the original model, subscriptions are less attractive relative to per-use pricing - the increase in
 results in a decrease in subscription revenue but has no impact on per-use revenue.
This, however, need not be the case if the rm abandons the low segment and prices at kh to
capture only the rent from the high types. By selling only to the heavy users, the rm is able
to charge a higher price and extract all social welfare, but it sells to only half of the consumers.
These two countervailing e¤ects may result in higher prots relative to the original model.
The next theorem establishes the condition for which heterogeneity in the consumersusage
rates may lead to an increase in the rms prots under subscription for V  U [0; v] and W () =
1=(  ):
Theorem 6 Rh () is quasiconcave. If  > 1, there exists a unique ; such that Rh () > Rl (0)
8 2 (; ). Otherwise, Rh ()  Rl (0) 8 and Rh () is increasing.
From Theorem 6, if the potential utilization is high, selling subscriptions can become even more
attractive when customers are heterogenous. To explain, remember that while subscription is
good at extracting revenues, it cannot control congestion. This becomes more problematic as 
increases. By selling to only the high usage customers, the rm forgoes revenue from low usage
consumers, but it is able to control congestion somewhat, while at the same time it extracts the
entire customer surplus. In this case, if  is high enough, this results in higher revenues than the
revenues obtained by selling to all consumers at  = 0.9
9This result is analogous to the result obtained by allowing for mixed strategy equilibrium. Setting a higher
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Let Rs () be the rms optimal revenue under subscription with degree of heterogeneity i.e.,
Rs () = max fRl () ; Rh ()g. Rs () can be fully characterized by ,  and 0 = = 2 [0; 1] (the
proof is similar to Lemma 1 and is omitted). The next Theorem compares between subscription
and per-use revenues when consumers are heterogeneous in usage rates for V  U [0; v] andW () =
1=(  ).
Theorem 7 When  = 0, subscription pricing always yields higher revenue than per-use. For each
value of  > 0 and every value of 0 2 [0; 1], there exists a unique e  ; 0, such that subscription
yields higher revenue than per-use pricing for  < e(; 0) (recall,  is the potential utilization, =
and 0 is a standardized measure of heterogeneity, =): Otherwise, per-use pricing yields higher
revenue.
Theorem 7, which is a generalization of Theorem 2, shows that when consumers are hetero-
geneous in their usage rates, subscription is preferred over per-use for low levels of  and per-use
is preferred over subscription for high levels of . It is interesting to assess how the degree of
congestion needed for per-use to be preferred changes when consumers are heterogeneous. For
various levels of positive congestion costs,  > 0, and di¤erent degrees of heterogeneity, 0, Figure 4
illustrates the potential utilization rate, e(; 0), at which the two schemes yield the same revenue.
Observe that e(; 0) = e(; 1). This follows because when 0 = 0, consumers are homogeneous and
Rl (0) is equivalent to the revenue of the original subscription model. When 0 = 1, the level of het-
erogeneity is so high, that the revenue obtained from selling only to the high usage consumersi.e.,
Rh (1) is equivalent to the revenue of the original subscription model. Observe also that the values
of e(; 0) = e(; 1) (marked by the dashed lines in Figure 4) correspond to the values presented in
Table 1. Figure 4 demonstrates that the degree of congestion needed for per-use to be preferred
over subscription when consumers are heterogeneous can either increase or decrease. This result
follows from the two countervailing e¤ects that heterogeneity has on subscription revenues: when
consumers are heterogeneous, the rm cannot extract all revenues by selling to all consumers and
thus the revenue accrued by selling to all consumers decreases. But, when the potential utiliza-
tion is high, the rm can benet from selling to only the high usage consumers if the degree of
heterogeneity is high (Theorem 6).
When capacity choice is endogenous (section 4), the rm that sells subscriptions can control
congestion not only by setting a high subscription price so that only high-type consumers purchase,
subscription price to make only a fraction of consumers join is equivalent to choosing the level of market segmentation,
. And, in fact, we nd that if (and only if)  > 1, allowing for a mixed strategy equilibrium benets subscription
even more.
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Figure 4. Potential utilization rates, e  ; 0, that yield identical revenue with per-use and subscription
pricing when consumers are heterogeneous.
but also by choosing the service rate. As in Section 4.2, instead of solving for , we can frame
the rms problem in terms of choosing the thresholds vl (if the rm decides to set a subscription
price so that all consumers purchase) and vh (if the rm sets a high subscription price so that only
high usage consumers purchase). Consider rst the choice of capacity conditional on all consumers
subscribing. In this case,
l = F (vl) + w=vl
and the rms prot function can be written as:
l (vl; ) =M l F (vl) (E [V jV  vl]  vl)  c
 
F (vl) + w=vl

:
The rm solves the maximization problem, maxvl l (vl; ).
Theorem 8 If  l E [V ] > c, there exists an upper bound l, such that for every   l, there exists
an optimal threshold vsl 2 argmaxl (vl; ), that yields non-negative prot, l (vsl; )  0. This
threshold is implicitly dened by:
vsl = 
s
1
 l
 F (vsl)  cf (vsl)
: (9)
Furthermore, if (A2) holds, then there exist two solutions to (9) and the smallest solution is the
unique optimal threshold conditional on all consumers subscribing.
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If, however, the rm decides to cater only to the high usage consumers,
h =MhF (vh) =2 + w=vh
and the rms prot function is:
h (vh; ) =Mh F (vh) (E [V jV  vh]  vh) =2  c
 
MhF (vh) =2 + w=vh

:
The rm solves the maximization problem, maxvh h (vh; ).
Theorem 9 If E [V ] > c, there exists an upper bound h, such that for every   h, there exists
an optimal threshold vsh 2 argmaxh (vh; ), that yields non-negative prot, h (vsh; )  0. This
threshold is implicitly dened by:
vsh = 
s

Mh=2
 1
F (vsh)  cf (vsh)
: (10)
Furthermore, if (A2) holds, then there exist two solutions to (10) and the smallest solution is the
unique optimal threshold conditional on only high-usage consumers subscribing.
Finally, the rm sets the subscription price that yields maximum prots,max fl (vsl; ) ;h (vsh; )g.
We show that when the rm chooses the level of capacity, customer heterogeneity always decreases
prots under subscription (Proposition 11 of the electronic companion). In this case the rm is
able to control congestion by choosing the service rate, . While selling only to heavy users had
a congestion control advantage in the xed capacity case, here the rm loses from selling to fewer
consumers. Hence, compared to the original model, subscriptions are less attractive in a relative
sense to per-use pricing. Moreover, the threshold capacity cost under which subscription prots
are higher than per-use prots is lower than in the original model (Corollary 1 of the electronic
companion).
We conclude that customer heterogeneity in usage rates generally makes per-use pricing more
attractive relative to subscription pricing. However, it can make subscription pricing even more
attractive, if capacity is xed and  and  are high.
Finally, we suspect that with heterogeneity in usage rates, a single two-part tari¤ is generally
no longer optimal for the rm - given that there are multiple segments, a single contract that is
designed to serve both types will no longer be able to extract the entire surplus. In this situation
the rm will typically improve its prots by designing a menu of two-part tari¤s or non-linear tari¤s
(e.g., Clay et al. 1992, Miravete 1996, and Masuda and Whang 2006).
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6 Conclusion
Using a queueing framework, we nd that a rm may prefer subscription pricing over per-use
pricing even if consumers dislike congestion. Furthermore, subscription pricing may be preferable
in situations that would a priori suggest a preference for per-use pricing: when customersstrongly
dislike the time to complete the service thereby making congestion costly to the rm. Subscription
pricing can dominate in these situations because (i) the rm must invest in a considerable amount
of capacity to reduce service times to a minimum and (ii) the rm can cover that large capacity cost
only if it can extract enough revenue from customers. Next, we nd that the absolute advantage
of subscription pricing can be considerable whereas the absolute advantage of per-use pricing is
generally modest - per-use pricing generates higher revenue or earns higher prot only when revenue
or prot is reasonably low. If customers are heterogeneous in their service rates, subscription
pricing can become even more attractive, if capacity is xed and the potential utilization and
market segmentation are high. Otherwise, heterogeneity in usage rates makes subscription pricing
less attractive relative to per-use. Overall, we conclude that the emphasis on per-use pricing in
the queueing literature is misplaced - we provide evidence that subscription pricing can indeed be
the preferable pricing strategy even in services that experience congestion.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Let g (; )  vs=v and l (; )  vp=v. The functions g and l will be used in the proofs of Lemma
1 and Theorem 2 below.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let %(v) = dRp(v)=dv; where
dRp(v)
dv
=  f(v)  v   wW ( F (v))+  F (v)  1 + wf(v)W 0   F (v) :
There is at least one maximum because %(0) >  and limv!1 %(v)  0. By construction, vp; given
by (2), satises the rst-order condition. Take %(vp) = 0 and rearrange terms:
1 
F (vp)
vpf (vp)
=
wW ( F (vp))
vp
+
w F (vp)W
0( F (vp))
vp
: (11)
The right hand side of (11) is decreasing in vp because F (v) = Pr fV  vg is decreasing in v and
W () is increasing and convex. The left hand side of (11) is increasing in vp because F is IFR.
(Actually, the left hand side is increasing even if F has an increasing generalized failure rate.) Thus,
there is a unique vp that satises %(vp) = 0:
Proof of Lemma 1. For the per-use case, Theorem 1 establishes that there is a unique op-
timal v; which is v when R0p(vp)  0: That condition simplies to w=  v=; or   1.
It follows that Rp(vp)  0 for all  2 [0; 1]: With subscription pricing, revenue is Rs (vs) =
 F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs). For V  U [0; v]; positive revenues occur 8vs < v. Note that the
threshold vs is given by vs = w=
 
   F (vs)

; where the LHS is increasing and the RHS is de-
creasing. Thus, for a non-negative revenue to occur, we must have that (when evaluating the above
condition), at v, v   w=  0, or   1. Next, we show that the relative revenues are a function
of  and : For the uniform distribution, condition (4) can be written as:
vs
v
=

1    1  vsv  (12)
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Note that g is a function of  and  only. Plugging vs into the subscription revenue function, we
obtain: Rs =

(1  g (; ))2 =2

v: Similarly for the pay-per-use case, we can express condition
(2) as:
vp
v
=
1
2
 
1 +
 
1    1  vpv 2
!
(13)
Note that l is a function of  and  only. Plugging vp into the per-use revenue function, we obtain:
Rp = (1  l (; ))

l (; )  
1   (1  l (; ))

v:
Thus, Rs=Rp depends only on  and .
Proof of Theorem 2. The fact that subscription always does better than per-use when w = 0
is immediate. In that case, F (vs)E [V jV  vs]  F (vp)E [V jV  vp] > F (vp) vp, where the
rst term is the revenue generated by subscription and the last term is the revenue generated
by per-use. Note that the rst inequality follows because vs  vp. The remainder of the proof
establishes the result for w > 0. Uniqueness: by implicitly di¤erentiating the revenue functions, we
get:
@Rs ()
@
=    (1  g)
2
+ (1   (1  g))2  v (14)
and
@Rp ()
@
=    (1  l)
2
(1   (1  l))2  v (15)
where g and l are shorthand notation for g (; ) and l (; ). To show that there exists a uniquee, such that Rs  ; 0 > Rp () 8 < e and Rs () < Rp () 8 > e, it is enough to require that 8
for which Rs () > Rp (), R0s() < R0p(). Rs () > Rp () implies that
(1  g)2
2 (1  l) > l  

1   (1  l) :
Rearranging (14) and (15), requiring R0s() < R0p(); we must have that
(1  g)2
2 (1  l) >
(1  l)

+ (1   (1  g))2

2 (1   (1  l))2 :
Thus, to complete the proof, it is enough to show that
l   
1   (1  l) >
(1  l)

+ (1   (1  g))2

2 (1   (1  l))2 : (16)
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Plugging in l (from condition (13)) into the LHS of (16) and rearranging, condition (16) becomes:

1   (1  l) + (1  l)

1   (1  g)
1   (1  l)
2
< 1: (17)
To see that condition (17) holds, note that the rst term is smaller than l (follows from the fact
that vs() < vp() 8, which implies that the term is less than g and that g < l) and that the
second term is less than (1  l) (because g < l implies that the squared term is less than 1).
The threshold utilization factor, e, is implicitly dened by:
F = (1  g (;e))2
2
  (1  l (;e))l (;e)  
1  e (1  l (;e))

= 0 (18)
Di¤erentiating F with respect to  yields:
dF
d
=
@F
@
+
@F
@e  @e@ + @F@g  @g@ + @F@l  @l@ = 0:
Note that the last term equals zero (from the rst order condition). Rearranging the terms, we
nd that:
@e
@
=  
@F
@ +
@F
@g  @g@
@F
@e =  
1 l
1 e(1 l) + (1  g) @g@
(1 l)2
(1 e(1 l))2
,
where
@g
@
=
1
1   (1  g) + g > 0:
Thus, we then get that @e () =@ < 0. Existence: it was established in proposition 4 of the
technical appendix that a threshold e exists for  = 0 and  = 1. Because @e () =@ < 0,
existence is guaranteed 8 2 [0; 1].
Proof of Theorem 3. (i)  = 0: Substituting  = 0 in equations (12) and (13) results in vs =
v and vp = (1 + ) v=2. Then, the following expressions for the revenue rates are immediate:
Rs =
v (1 + )2
2
; Rp =
v (1 + )2
4
(ii) !1: Rearranging (12), we get:
vs
v

1  

+
vs
v

=


As  ! 1; there are up to two roots that solve the above. The larger of the two is a maximum.
This implies that in this case, we have
lim
!1
vs
v
= lim
!1
  1

= 1:
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Similarly, rewriting (13), we get
vp
v
  1
2

1  

+
vp
v
2
=

22
:
This implies that for all pricing schemes,
lim
!1
vs
v
= lim
!1
vp
v
= lim
!1
  1

= 1
Substituting into the revenue rates, we obtain for !1: lim!1Rs = lim!1 Rp = 0:
Proof of Theorem 4. We prove by contradiction that if there is a maximum, it is unique.
Suppose there exist v1 and v3 such that v1 < v3; p(v1)  0; p(v3)  0, 0p(v1) = 0; 0p(v3) = 0;
i.e., both are local maxima with non-negative prots. Our conditions imply for both v 2 fv1; v3g
that
v   c =
F (v)
f(v)
+
p
F (v)
v   c
2
 p
F (v)
where the rst condition is the rst-order condition and the second condition ensures non-negativity
of prots. Combining the two conditions we have
F (v)
f(v)
 p
F (v)
(19)
Given that v1 and v3 are local maxima, there must be a local minima, v2; such that v1 < v2 < v3:
There are two cases to consider: p(v2) < 0 and p(v2) > 0:
Consider p(v2) < 0: Analogous to (19), 0p(v2) = 0 and p(v2) < 0 imply
F (v2)
f(v2)
<
p
F (v2)
(20)
Because F is IFR, the left hand side of (20) is decreasing. Furthermore, the right hand side of (20)
is increasing. As a result, v1 < v2 < v3 implies
F (v1)
f(v1)
>
F (v2)
f(v2)
>
F (v3)
f(v3)
(21)
and
p
F (v3)
>
p
F (v2)
>
p
F (v1)
: (22)
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Combining (20), (21) and (22) yields
F (v3)
f(v3)
<
F (v2)
f(v2)
<
p
F (v2)
<
p
F (v3)
;
which contradicts (19).
Consider the second case, p(v2) > 0: Rearranging the rst order condition, let
z(v) =  v +
F (v)
f(v)
+
p
F (v)
+ c
Di¤erentiate:
z0(v) =  1 

f 0(v) F (v) + f(v)2
f(v)2

+
f(v)
2 F (v)
p
F (v)
Given that F is IFR, the second term is positive. (19) implies the third term is less than 1/2.
Hence, z0(v) < 0 for v1; v2 and v3: Because 0p(v1) = 0p(v2) = 0p(v3) = 0; it follows that
z(v1) = z(v2) = z(v2) = 0: However, due to the continuity of z(v); this is not feasible if z0(v) < 0
for v1; v2 and v3:
Observe that p(0) =  c   2
p
cw is negative. Let (0; v) be the support of F (v); then
limv!v p(v) = 0. Given that p(0) is nite and limv!v p(v) = 0; a maximum exists if there
exists a vp < v such that 0p(vp) = 0 and p(vp)  0: Requiring that p(vp)  0 is equivalent to
having
p(v)
 F (v)
= v   c  2p
F (v)
 0
for some v. Assume  = 0. If v > c, there must be a solution with positive prot. Let Mp() 
p(vp () ; ). From the Envelope Theorem, we have: @Mp()=@ =  
q
F (vp) < 0; which means
that p(vp () ; ) is decreasing in : This implies there exists some p such that p(vp () ; ) > 0
for   p: Otherwise, there does not exist an optimal vp < v.
vp is the smallest solution to (5): While we cannot compute the number of possible solutions to
(5) for a general IFR distribution F , we show by contradiction, that the optimal vp is the smallest
solution to (5). Note rst that p(0) =   (c+ 2) < 0 and that 0p(0) > 0. Thus, the smallest
solution to (5) is a local maximum. We have already shown that if there exists a local maximum
so that p(v)  0, it is unique. Suppose there exist two local maxima with negative prots, v1 and
v3 such that v1 < v3; i.e., p(v1) < 0; p(v3) < 0, 0p(v1) = 0; 0p(v3) = 0. Our conditions for both
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v 2 fv1; v3g imply that
v   c =
F (v)
f(v)
+
p
F (v)
v   c
2
<
p
F (v)
Combining the two conditions we have
F (v)
f(v)
<
p
F (v)
Assume there exists a local maxima, v2; such that v1 < v2 < v3 and p(v2) > 0: This implies that
F (v2)
f(v2)
>
p
F (v2)
(23)
Consider v1. Because F is IFR, v1 < v2 implies:
F (v1)
f(v1)
>
F (v2)
f(v2)
(24)
and
p
F (v2)
>
p
F (v1)
: (25)
Combining conditions (23) and (25), we get:
F (v2)
f(v2)
>
p
F (v2)
>
p
F (v1)
>
F (v1)
f(v1)
which contradicts condition (24). Letting v2 < v3, however, a contradiction cannot be reached,
which does not preclude the existence of additional solutions to (5) in the negative range for a
general IFR distribution. Combining the results we conclude that vp is the smallest v that solves
(5).
Su¢ cient condition for at most two solutions to (5): Rearranging (5), we have:
vp   1
h (vp)
=
q
F (vp)
+ c:
The RHS is convex and increasing and the LHS is increasing. Taking the derivative of the LHS,
we get 1 + h0(vp)= (h (vp))2 : Thus, if condition (A1) holds, there can be at most two solutions to
(5), with the smallest one being the maximum.
Proof of Theorem 5. First note that s(0) =  1 and that limv!v s(v) = 0. Di¤erentiating
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s(v), we obtain:
ds(v)
dv
= c
 w
v2
+ f(v)

   F (v)
Equating to zero and rearranging terms, the result in (7) follows.
A maximum exists if there exists a vs < v such that 0s(vs) = 0 and s(vs)  0: Requiring that
s(vs)  0 is equivalent to having
s(v)
 F (v)
= E [V jV  v]  v   c  
2
v F (v)
 0
for some v. Assume  = 0. Then, if E [V ] > c, there must be a solution with positive prot.
Let Ms()  s(vs () ; ). From the Envelope Theorem, we have: @Ms()=@ =  2=vs < 0,
which means that s(vs () ; ) is decreasing in : Note that even though we have not ruled out the
existence of several local maxima vs, s(vs () ; ) is decreasing in  at every critical point. This
implies there exists some s such that s(vs () ; ) for   s: Otherwise, there does not exist an
optimal vs < v.
Furthermore, denote the RHS of (7) by z(v), i.e., z(v) =  (1  c  h (v))  12   F (v)  12 :We want
to show that there exists a unique vs that maximizes prot and solves vs = z(vs). Because F is
IFR, z(v) is increasing. Di¤erentiating z(v), we get:
z0(v) =

2

c  h0 (v) (1  c  h (v))  32   F (v)  12 + f (v) (1  c  h (v))  12   F (v)  32
Plugging in (7), we get:
z0(vs) =
1
2

h (vs) vs +
c  h0 (vs) vs
1  c  h (vs)

:
A su¢ cient condition for z0(vs) to be increasing is for both terms in the brackets to be increasing.
The rst term is the generalized failure rate. It is increasing if F is IGFR. The second term is
increasing if h0 (vs) vs is increasing and F is IFR. Thus, under these conditions, z(vs) is increasing
and convex and there are at most two solutions to v = z(v). Because s(0) < 0 and 0s(0) > 0,
the smallest solution is the maximum.
Proof of Theorem 6. First note that Rh () = Rl (0). Existence: di¤erentiating Rh () with
respect to , we get:
dRh(; vsh ())
d
=
@Rh(; vsh ())
@
+
@Rh(; vsh ())
@vs
 dvsh
d
=
M (v   vsh)2
4v
  Mh () (v   vsh)
2v
 dvsh
d
;
where dvsh () =d > 0. Let %() = dRh()=d. Because lim!0 %() > 0 and the domain of  is
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bounded above, there exists at least one maximum. Uniqueness: rewrite vsh = wW
 
Mh F (vsh)=2

in terms of :
 (vsh) =
2

  wvsh

MF (vsh)
   (26)
Plugging the expression in the revenue function, we get:
Rh(vsh) =

  w
vsh

(E [V jV  vsh]  vsh) =

  w
vsh

v   vsh
2

;
where the last inequality follows because of the uniform distribution assumption. Solving for the
FOC yields:
vsh =
r
wv

; (27)
which is unique. Thus, Rh () is quasiconcave. Plugging equation (27) in (26) and simplifying, we
obtain that  +  (vs) = 2=M . This  is achievable if  >  and the results follow. Otherwise, the
maximum Rh () is obtained for  =  and Rl (0) > Rh () 8 2 [0; ).
Proof of Theorem 7. By implicitly di¤erentiating the revenue functions, we get:
@Rl
 
; 0

@
=   
 
1  0 (1  gl)2
+ (1   (1  gl))2
 v; (28)
@Rh
 
; 0

@
=  


1+0
2
2
(1  gh)2


1+0
2

+

1 

1+0
2

 (1  gh)
2  v (29)
and @Rp () =@, given by (15), where gl  vsl=v and gh  vsh=v (analogously to g and l). To
complete the proof, it is enough to show: (1) there exists at most one e, such that Rl  ; 0 > Rp ()
8 < e and Rl  ; 0 < Rp () 8 > e; (2) there exists a unique e, such that Rh  ; 0 > Rp ()
8 < e and Rh  ; 0 < Rp () 8 > e; (3) Rl   = 0; 0 < Rh ( = 0), then Rl  ; 0 < Rh  ; 0
8:
(1) Rl
 
; 0

> Rp () implies that 
1  0 (1  gl)2
2 (1  l) > l  

1   (1  l) :
Rearranging (28) and (15), requiring R0l(; 
0) < R0p(); we must have that
 
1  0 (1  g)2
2 (1  l) >
(1  l)

+ (1   (1  g))2

2 (1   (1  l))2 :
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Thus, to complete the proof, it is enough to show that
l   
1   (1  l) >
(1  l)

+ (1   (1  g))2

2 (1   (1  l))2 ;
which follows from the proof of Theorem 2.
(2) Uniqueness: Rh
 
; 0

> Rp () implies that
1+0
2

(1  gh)2
2 (1  l) > l  

1   (1  l) :
Rearranging (29) and (15), requiring R0h(; 
0) < R0p(); we must have that

1+0
2

(1  gh)2
2 (1  l) >
(1  l)


 
1 + 0

+

1  

1+0
2

(1  gh)
2
2 (1   (1  l))2 :
Thus, to complete the proof, it is enough to show that
l   
1   (1  l) >
(1  l)


 
1 + 0

+

1  

1+0
2

(1  gh)
2
2 (1   (1  l))2 : (30)
Plugging in l (from condition (13)) into the LHS of (30) and rearranging, condition (30) becomes:

(1   (1  l))2 + (1  l)
0@1  

1+0
2

(1  gh)
1   (1  l)
1A2    (1  l)  1  0
(1   (1  l))2 < 1: (31)
To see that condition (31) holds, note that the rst term is smaller than l (follows from (13)),
that the second term is smaller than (1  l) (because gh < l implies that the squared term is
less than 1) and the third term is negative. Existence: it is established in proposition 10 of the
technical appendix that 80 a threshold eh  ; 0 for which Rh  eh; 0 = Rp (eh) exists for  = 0
and  = 1. Because @eh  ; 0 =@ < 0 (proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 and is therefore
omitted), existence is guaranteed 8 2 [0; 1].
(3) Note rst that gl = g and gh  g. Therefore, gh  gl. Rl
 
 = 0; 0

< Rh ( = 0) if and
only if 0 > 1=3: Thus, we need to show that Rl
 
; 0

< Rh
 
; 0
 8 and 80 > 1=3. Substituting
the revenue functions and rearranging, it is enough to show that:
1 + 0
2
(1  gh)2 >
 
1  0 (1  gl)2 :
Because gh  gl, it is enough to show that 1+02 > 1  0, which holds for 0 > 1=3.
Proof of Theorem 8. First note that l(0) =  1 and that limvl!v l(vl) = 0. Di¤erentiating
35
l(vl), we obtain:
dl(vl)
dvl
= c

w
v2l
+ f(vl)

 M l F (vl)
Equating to zero and rearranging terms, the result in (9) follows.
A maximum exists if there exists a vsl < v such that 0l(vsl) = 0 and l(vsl)  0: Requiring
that l(vsl)  0 is equivalent to having
l(vl)
 F (vl)
=
 l

(E [V jV  vl]  vl)  c  
2
vl F (vl)
 0
for some vl. Assume  = 0. Then, if
 l
 E [V ] > c, there must be a solution with positive prot.
Let Ml()  l(vsl () ; ). From the Envelope Theorem, we have: @Ml()=@ =  2=vsl < 0,
which means that l(vsl () ; ) is decreasing in : Note that even though we have not ruled out the
existence of several local maxima vsl, l(vsl () ; ) is decreasing in  at every critical point. This
implies there exists some l such that l(vsl () ; ) for   l: Otherwise, there does not exist an
optimal vsl < v.
Furthermore, denote the RHS of (9) by z(vl), i.e., z(vl) = 
 
 l
   c  h (vl)
  1
2
 
F (vl)
  1
2 : We
want to show that there exists a unique vsl that maximizes prot and solves vsl = z(vsl). Because
F is IFR, z(vl) is increasing. Di¤erentiating z(vl), we get:
z0(vl) =

2

c  h0 (vl)
 l

  c  h (vl)
  3
2   F (vl)  12 + f (vl) l

  c  h (vl)
  1
2   F (vl)  32
Plugging in (9), we get:
z0(vsl) =
1
2

h (vsl) vsl +
c  h0 (vsl) vsl
 l
   c  h (vsl)

:
A su¢ cient condition for z0(vsl) to be increasing is for both terms in the brackets to be increasing.
The rst term is the generalized failure rate. It is increasing if F is IGFR. The second term is
increasing if h0 (vsl) vsl is increasing and F is IFR. Thus, under these conditions, z(vsl) is increasing
and convex and there are at most two solutions to vl = z(vl). Because l(0) < 0 and 0l(0) > 0,
the smallest solution is the maximum.
Proof of Theorem 9. First note that h(0) =  1 and that limvh!v h(vh) = 0. Di¤erentiating
h(vh), we obtain:
dh(vh)
dvh
= c

w
v2h
+Mhf(vh)=2

 Mh F (vh)=2
Equating to zero and rearranging terms, the result in (10) follows.
A maximum exists if there exists a vsh < v such that 0h(vsh) = 0 and h(vsh)  0: Requiring
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that h(vsh)  0 is equivalent to having
h(vh)
Mh F (vh)=2
= E [V jV  vh]  vh   c  
Mh=2
2
vh F (vh)
 0
for some vh. Assume  = 0. Then, if E [V ] > c, there must be a solution with positive prot. Let
Mh()  h(vsh () ; ). From the Envelope Theorem, we have: @Mh()=@ =  2=vsh < 0,
which means that h(vsh () ; ) is decreasing in : Note that even though we have not ruled out
the existence of several local maxima vsh, h(vsh () ; ) is decreasing in  at every critical point.
This implies there exists some h such that h(vsh () ; ) for   h: Otherwise, there does not
exist an optimal vsh < v.
Furthermore, denote the RHS of (10) by z(vh), i.e., z(vh) = 
q

Mh=2
(1  c  h (vh)) 
1
2
 
F (vh)
  1
2 :
Note that z(vh) = z(v), where z(v) is the RHS of (7) from Theorem 5 and  is a positive constant.
Therefore, the remaining of the proof is the same.
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